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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Risk is a fundamental concept that affects human behavior and decisions
in many real-life situations. Whether a person wants to invest in the stock
market, tries to select the best health insurance or just wants to cross the
street, he/she will face risky decisions every day. Therefore, risk attitudes
are of high importance for decisions in many economics-related contexts. A
multitude of studies elicit risk preferences in order to control for risk atti-
tudes, as it is clear that they might play a relevant role in explaining results
- e.g. de Ve´ricourt et al. (2013) in the newsvendor setting, Murnighan et
al. (1988) in bargaining, Beck (1994) in redistribution or Tanaka et al.
(2010) in linking experimental data to household income, to name just
a few. Moreover, several papers try to shed light on the causes of risk-
seeking and risk-averse behavior in the general population with laboratory
(Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008), internet (von Gaudecker et al., 2011) and
field experiments (Andersson et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 2007). Since the
seminal papers by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005), approximately 20 meth-
ods have been published which provide methods to elicit risk preferences.
They differ from each other in terms of the varied parameters, represen-
tation and framing. Many of these different risk elicitation methods have
the same theoretical foundation under expected utility theory (EUT) and
therefore claim to measure the same parameter - a subject’s “true” risk
preference. However, there are significant differences in results depending
on the method used, as an increasing number of evidence suggests.
It follows that if someone’s revealed preference is dependent on the mea-
surement method used, scientific results and real-world conclusions might
be biased and misleading. In the end, our goal is to provide a blueprint
on how to measure risk - and potentially other - preferences so that one’s
actual choice in the elicitation tasks clearly reflect his/her real preferences
and are stable over time.
As far as existing comparison studies are concerned, they usually com-
pare two to three methods with each other and often use different stakes,
parameters, framing, representation, etc., which makes their results hardly
comparable. Our paper complements existing experimental literature by
making the following contribution: Taking the method by Holt and Laury
(2002) as a basis, we conduct a comprehensive comparison of the multiple
price list (MPL) versions of risk elicitation methods by classifying all meth-
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ods into nine categories. To the best of our knowledge, no investigation
- including various measures of between- and within-method consistency
- has ever been conducted in the literature that incorporates such a high
number of methods. To isolate the effect of different methods, we consis-
tently use the MPL representation and calibrate the risk intervals to be
the same for each method assuming expected utility theory (EUT) and
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), while also keeping the risk-neutral
expected payoff of each method constant and employing a within-subject
design.
We investigate the within-method consistency of each method by com-
paring the differences in subjects’ initial and repeated decisions within the
same MPL method. We assess the methods’ self-perceived complexity and
shed light on whether between-method consistency exists by comparing the
distributions of risk attitudes among elicitation methods. In the end, we
provide suggestions which specific MPL representation to use by compar-
ing our results to decisions in two benchmark games that resemble real-life
settings: investments in capital markets and auctions. Therefore, we ana-
lyze the methods along two dimensions: robustness and predictive power.
We solidify our results by various robustness and consistency checks e.g.
by relaxing our assumptions on the functional form of subjects’ risk atti-
tudes.
We find that a particular modification of the method by Holt and Laury
(2002) derived by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) has the highest predictive
power in investment settings both according to the OLS regression and
Spearman rank correlation. In addition, specific certainty equivalent meth-
ods derived by Bruner (2009) perform also relatively well in these analyses.
Moreover, the method by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) clearly outperforms
the other methods in terms of within-method consistency and it is perceived
as relatively simple - in the end, our study provides the recommendation
for researchers to implement this method when measuring risk attitudes.
1.1 Multiple Price Lists Explained
Incentivized risk preference elicitation methods aim to quantify subjects’
risk perceptions based on their revealed preferences. We present nine meth-
ods in a unified structure - the commonly used MPL format - to our sub-
jects, taking one of the most cited methods as a basis: Holt and Laury
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Table 1: Risk Parameter Intervals (Holt/Laury)
Interpretation Switching Risk Parameter
by Holt/Laury Point Interval
(2002)
highly risk loving
very risk loving
risk loving
risk neutral
slightly risk averse
risk averse
very risk averse
highly risk averse
stay in bed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Never
ρ ≤ −0.95
−0.95 < ρ ≤ −0.49
−0.49 < ρ ≤ −0.15
−0.15 < ρ ≤ 0.15
0.15 < ρ ≤ 0.41
0.41 < ρ ≤ 0.68
0.68 < ρ ≤ 0.97
0.97 < ρ ≤ 1.37
ρ > 1.37
Notes: This table indicates the mapping from a subject’s chosen switching point into the
resulting risk parameter intervals in each method; the leftmost column contains the
interpretation of the risk intervals; ”Never” means a subject prefers the option ”Left” in
each row
(2002). The MPL table structure is as follows: Each table has multiple
rows, and in each row all subjects face a lottery (two columns) on one side
of the table, and a lottery or a certain payoff (one or two columns) on
the other side, depending on the particular method. Then, from row to
row, one or more of the parameters change. The methods differ from each
other by the parameter which is changing. As the options on the right side
become strictly more attractive from row to row, a subject indicates the
row where he/she wants to switch from the left option to the right option.
This switching point then gives us an interval for a subject’s risk preference
parameter according to Table 11, assuming EUT and CRRA2.
Andersen et al. (2006) consider that the main advantage of the MPL for-
mat is that it is transparent to subjects and it provides simple incentives
for truthful preference revelation. They additionally list its common usage,
1 To ease comparison to existing studies, we used exactly the same coefficient intervals as Holt and
Laury (2002).
2 u(c) = c
1−ρ
1−ρ
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its simplicity and the little time it takes as further benefits. As far as the
specific risk elicitation method in the MPL framework designed by Holt
and Laury (2002) is concerned, it has proven itself numerous times in pro-
viding explanations for several phenomena such as behavior in 2x2 games
(Goeree et al., 2003), market settings (Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007),
smoking, heavy drinking, being overweight or obese (Anderson and Mel-
lor, 2008), consumption practices (Lusk and Coble, 2005) and many others.
We acknowledge that recent studies (Tanaka et al., 2010; Bocqueho et al.,
2011) document potential empirical support for prospect theory (PT) when
it comes to risk attitudes: Wakker (2010) provides an extensive review on
risk under PT. However, our choice for EUT is justified by Harrison et al.
(2010), who provide evidence that the majority of subjects behave accord-
ing to EUT. Moreover, we justify using CRRA as Wakker (2008) claims
that it is the most commonly postulated assumption among economists.
Most recently, Chiappori and Paiella (2011) provide evidence on the valid-
ity of this assumption in economic-financial decisions.3
We group our aforementioned nine risk elicitation methods into two cate-
gories:
1. The certainty equivalent methods (CE methods), where on one side
of the table there is always a 100% chance of getting a particular
certain payoff and on the other side there is a lottery.
2. The Holt/Laury methods (HL methods), where you face lotteries on
both sides.
We therefore primarily conduct a clean comparison of different MPL risk
elicitation methods. What we do not claim, however, is that the method
devised by Holt/Laury (2002) (or MPL in general) is the most fitting to
measure people’s risk preferences - we strive to give a recommendation to
researchers who already intend to use Holt/Laury (2002) in their studies,
and provide a better alternative that shares its attributes with the original
Holt/Laury design.
It should be mentioned that there is an alternative interpretation of our
study, to be taken with a grain of salt: The different MPL methods can
3 Note that this approach is also popular among economists due to its computational ease: The vast
majority of economic experiments assumes CRRA as well, which makes our results comparable to
theirs.
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Table 2: Method Overview
What is changing?
Method Probability Highest Payoff Lowest Payoff Sure Payoff
CEp yes no no no
CEhigh no yes no no
CElow no no yes no
CEsure no no no yes
CEall no yes yes yes
HLp yes no no NA
HLhigh no yes no NA
HLlow no no yes NA
HLall yes yes yes NA
Notes: This table indicates which parameters change from row to row in each method.
also be conceived as a mapping of existing risk elicitation methods (from
other frameworks) to the MPL space.
Up to now, different risk elicitation methods were compared by keeping the
original designs and comparing the differences in elicited risk parameters.
But the approach to keep the original designs comes at a price: The meth-
ods differ in many dimensions, so any differences found can be attributed
to any of those particular characteristics. Our approach can be understood
as a way to make all risk elicitation methods as similar as possible, with
the drawback of losing the direct connection to the original representation.
This paper should therefore primarily be seen as a comparison of different
MPL risk elicitation methods, and the resulting comparison of existing risk
elicitation methods by mapping them into the same space is only reported
for the sake of completeness.
1.2 Literature Review
We will now discuss the different methods in greater detail and how they
are embedded in the literature, if at all. Table 2 provides a summary of
the exact parameter that is changing across methods. For a complete list
of all methods with the corresponding parameter values (as presented to
subjects), please refer to the Appendix.
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1.2.1 CE Methods
Among the CE methods, there are four parameters that can be changed:
The sure payoff (sure), the high payoff of the lottery (high), the low payoff
of the lottery (low) or the probability of getting the high payoff (p) (or the
probability of getting the low payoff (1 − p), respectively). The param-
eters must of course be chosen in such a way that high > sure > low
always holds. For instance, we denote the CE method where the low pay-
off is changing by ”CElow”, the CE method with the varying certainty
equivalent by ”CEsure” or the Certainty Equivalent method where the
probabilities are changing as ”CEp”. For example, Cohen et al. (1987)
used risk elicitation tasks in which probabilities and lottery outcomes were
held constant and only the certainty equivalent was varied.
A recent investigation by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) presents a similar method
(CEsure method) in an MPL format with 50-50 probabilities. Bruner (2009)
presents a particular certainty equivalent method, where the certainty
equivalent and the lottery outcomes are held constant, but the correspond-
ing probabilities of the lotteries are changing (CEp method). Additionally,
Bruner (2009) introduces another method where only the potential high
outcomes of lotteries vary (CEhigh method). Binswanger (1980) intro-
duced a method (CEall) where only one of the options has a certainty
equivalent. The other options consist of lotteries where the probabilities
are fixed at 50-50, but both the high and the low payoff are changing.
These methods have later been redesigned and presented in a more so-
phisticated format as a single choice task by Eckel and Grossman (2002,
2008). Although not present in the literature, we chose to include a method
where the potential low outcome varies for reasons of completeness (CElow
method). For examples, see Tables 9-13 in the Appendix, which correspond
to the CE methods.
1.2.2 HL Methods
Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) introduced one of the most cited elicitation
method under EUT up to now, where potential outcomes are held con-
stant and the respective probabilities change (HLp). Drichoutis and Lusk
(2012) suggest a similar framework where the outcomes of different lotter-
ies change while the probabilities are held constant. We differentiate these
methods further into HLhigh and HLlow depending on whether the high
or the low outcome is varied in the MPL. Additionally, the HLall method
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varies both the probabilities and the potential earnings at the same time.
Many risk elicitation tasks used in the literature fit into the framework
of choosing between different lotteries. Sabater and Grande (2002) provide
ten discrete options with different probabilities and outcomes to choose
from. Lejuez et al. (2002) introduce the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART) where subjects could pump up a balloon, and their earnings de-
pend on the final size of the balloon. The larger the balloon gets, the more
likely it will explode, in which case the subject earns nothing. Visschers
et al. (2005) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2010) use a pie chart for prob-
abilities and a slider for outcomes to visualize a similar trade-off effect in
their experiment. Crosetto and Filippin (2013) present their Bomb Risk
Elicitation Task with an interesting framing which quantifies the aforemen-
tioned tradeoff between probability and potential earnings with the help of
a bomb explosion. For examples, see Tables 14-17 in the Appendix, which
correspond to the HL methods.
1.2.3 Questionnaire Methods
In addition to the MPL methods, we chose to also incorporate question-
naire risk elicitation methods into our study. Several methods have been in-
troduced that evaluate risk preferences with non-incentivized survey-based
methods, and the questions and the methodology they use are very similar.
The most recently published ones include the question from the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (Dohmen et al., 2011) or the Domain-Specific
Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) by Blais and Weber (2006). For a more
detailed description, see the last paragraph of Section 2.
1.2.4 Comparison Studies
The question arises which method to use if there are so many different
methods for risk elicitation and whether they lead to the same results.
There are comparison studies, but the majority of them compares only
two methods with each other, thus their scope is limited. The question of
within-method consistency has been addressed by several papers: Harrison
et al. (2005) document high re-test stability of the method introduced by
Holt and Laury (2002). Andersen et al. (2008b) test consistency of the HLp
(2002) method within a 17-month time frame. They find some variation
in risk attitudes over time, but do not detect a general tendency for risk
attitudes to increase or decrease. This result was confirmed in Andersen
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et al. (2008a). Recently, Straznicka (2012) records high temporal stability
of five known methods on the aggregate level and a relatively small change
in individual perceptions.
Interestingly, more work has been done on the field of between-method
consistency. Fausti and Gillespie (2000) compare risk preference elicita-
tion methods with hypothetical questions using results from a mail survey.
Isaac and James (2000) conclude that risk attitudes and relative ranking
of subjects is different in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure
and in the first-price sealed-bid auction setting. Berg et al. (2005) confirm
that assessment of risk preferences varies generally across institutions in
auction settings. In another comparison study, Bruner (2009) shows that
changing the probabilities versus varying the payoffs leads to different lev-
els of risk aversion in the HL tasks. Moreover, Dave et al. (2010) conclude
that subjects show different degrees of risk aversion in the Holt and Laury
(2002) and in the Eckel and Grossman (2008) task. Their results were
confirmed by Reynaud and Couture (2012) who used farmers as the sub-
ject pool in a field experiment. Bleichrodt (2002) argues that a potential
reason for these differences might be attributed to the fact that the origi-
nal method by Eckel and Grossman (2008) does not cover the risk seeking
domain, which can be included with the slight modification we made. Dul-
leck et al. (2014) test the method devised by Andreoni and Harbaugh
(2010) using a graphical representation against the HLp and describe both
a surprisingly high level of within- and inter-method inconsistency. Dri-
choutis and Lusk (2012) compare the HLp method to a modified version
of it where probabilities are held constant. Their analysis reveals that the
elicited risk preferences differ from each other both at the individual and at
the aggregate level. Most recently, Crosetto and Filippin (2013) compare
five different risk preference elicitation methods and confirm the relatively
high instability across methods.
In parallel, a debate among survey-based and incentivized preference elic-
itation methods emerged. Eckel and Grossman (2002) conclude that non-
incentivized survey-based methods provide misleading conclusions for in-
centivized real-world settings. In line with this finding, Anderson and
Mellor (2009) claim that non-salient survey-based elicitation methods and
the HLp method yield different results. On the contrary, Lo¨nnqvist et al.
(2011) provide evidence that the survey-based measure, which Dohmen et
al. (2011) had implemented, explains decisions in the trust game better
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than the HLp task. Charness and Viceisza (2012) provide evidence from
developing countries that hypothetical willingness-to-risk questions and the
HLp task deliver deviating results.
1.2.5 Theoretical Considerations
A recent stream of literature broadens the horizon of investigation to the-
oretical aspects of different elicitation methods: Weber et al. (2002) show
that people have different risk attitudes in various fields of life, thus risk
preferences seem to be domain-specific. Hey et al. (2009) investigate noise
and bias under four different elicitation procedures and emphasize that elic-
itation methods should be regarded as strongly context specific measures.
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) provide an overview and a broader summary
of elicitation methods under laboratory conditions, whereas Charness et al.
(2013) evaluate several risk preference elicitation methods based on their
advantages and disadvantages and give suggestions which ones to use.
In addition, there is evidence that framing and representation matters.
Wilkinson (2005) advised against using pie charts showing probabilities
and payoffs as human beings are not good at estimating angles. Hershey
et al. (1982) identify important sources of bias to be taken into account
and pitfalls to avoid when designing elicitation tasks. Most importantly,
these include task framing, differences between the gain and loss domains
and the variation of outcome and probability levels. Von Gaudecker et al.
(2008) show that the same risk elicitation methods for the same subjects
deliver different results when using different frameworks - e.g. multiple
price list, trade-off method, ordered lotteries, graphical chart represen-
tation, etc. This procedural indifference was confirmed by Attema and
Brouwer (2012) as well, which implies that risk preferences on an individ-
ual level are susceptible to the representation and framing used.
All previous paragraphs therefore lead us to the conclusion that meth-
ods should be compared to each other by using the same representation
and format. This justifies our decision to compare our methods using the
standard MPL framework which guarantees that the differences cannot be
attributed to the different framing and representation of elicitation tasks.
However, this comes at the price that we had to change some of the meth-
ods slightly, which implies that they are not exactly the same as they were
published originally. We certainly do not claim that the MPL is the only
valid framework, but our choice for it seems justified by its common usage
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Table 3: Link between MPL Representation and Literature
Method Corresponding Literature
CEp Bruner (2009)
CEhigh Bruner (2009)
CElow
CEsure Cohen, Jaffray and Said (1987),
Abdellaoui, Driouchi and L’Haridon (2011)
CEall Binswanger (1980), Eckel and Grossman (2008)
HLp Holt and Laury (2002), Holt and Laury (2005)
HLhigh Drichoutis and Lusk (2012)
HLlow Drichoutis and Lusk (2012)
HLall Sabater and Grande (2002), Lejuez et al. (2002),
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2010), Crosetto and Filippin (2013)
Questionnaire Weber, Blais and Betz (2002), Dohmen et al. (2011)
Notes: In the first column, this table lists all MPL and questionnaire methods, and in
the second column the corresponding literature.
and relative simplicity. We consider a future investigation using a differ-
ent representation technique as a potentially interesting addition. Also,
we emphasize that the differences in our results exist among the MPL
representations of the methods and they can only be generalized to the
original methods to a limited extent; see Table 3 for an overview of the
link between the MPL representation and the particular method that was
published originally.
2 Design
We provide a laboratory experiment to compare different MPL risk elicita-
tion methods. Subjects answered the risk elicitation questions first. Then,
benchmark games were presented to them to gauge predictive power, which
was followed by a non-incentivized questionnaire. We will provide a de-
tailed description on the exact procedures of each part in the later para-
graphs.
We conducted ten sessions at the Vienna Center for Experimental Eco-
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nomics (VCEE) with 97 subjects using a within-subject design.4 Sessions
lasted 1 hour and 55 minutes on average. The range of earnings was be-
tween 3.00e and 50.00e, amounting to a payment of 20.78e on average.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) was used for
recruiting subjects.
After receiving instructions on screen and in written form, subjects went
through the nine incentivized risk elicitation methods in random order.
In order to avoid potential incentive effects mentioned by Holt and Laury
(2002), the expected earnings for a risk-neutral individual were equal in
each and every method. Furthermore, to avoid potential biases due to the
difference between gains and losses (Hershey et al., 1982), each of our lot-
teries is set in the gains domain. Andersen et al. (2006) found evidence
that there is a slight tendency of anchoring and choosing a switching point
around the middle for risk elicitation tasks. In order to counteract anchor-
ing and one-directional distortion of preferences as a consequence of this
unaviodable pull-to-center effect, each risk elicitation task appeared ran-
domly either top-down or bottom-up. Depending on randomization, out of
nine potential switching opportunities the fourth or the sixth option were
the risk-neutral switching points.
Subjects also had the opportunity to look at their given answer and modify
it right after each decision if they wished to do so. After making a decision
in each method, we asked subjects the following question: ”On a scale
from 1 to 10, how difficult was it for you to make a decision in the previous
setting?”. With this question we assessed self-perceived complexity of the
tasks, since there is evidence in the literature (Mador et al., 2000) that
subjects make noisier decisions if the complexity of a lottery increases, and
therefore a less complex method is preferred. Moreover, Dave et al. (2010)
outline the trade-offs between noise, accuracy and subjects’ mathematics
skills. They suggest that it is a good strategy to make MPL tasks sim-
pler for subjects. In this spirit, we asked our subjects to indicate the row
in which they switched from the ’LEFT’ column to the ’RIGHT’ column,
thereby enforcing a single switching point (SSP). Using this framework,
subjects were not required to make a decision for each and every row in
each method, which would have meant more than 100 monotonous, repeti-
4 One subject has been excluded after repeatedly being unable to answer the control questions cor-
rectly.
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tive binary choices throughout the experiment. Additionally, this approach
ensures that the subjects were guaranteed to give answers without prefer-
ence reversals. We consider this option more viable than accepting multiple
switching points - thus allowing inconsistent choices - and using the total
number of “safe” choices to determine a subject’s risk coefficient interval,
in line with the findings of Gonzalez and Wu (1999) or Jacobson and Petrie
(2009).
In order to test within-method consistency, three of the nine methods were
randomly chosen and presented to subjects again - without telling them
that they had already encountered that particular method. This approach
allows us to test both within-method and inter-method consistency. The
modification of subjects’ answers was allowed here once as well. The per-
ceived complexity of tasks was also elicited again.
Control questions were used for the preference elicitation methods and for
every benchmark game in order to verify that subjects understood the task
they were about to perform. We incorporated the random lottery incen-
tive system emphasized by Cubitt et al. (1998). Thus, the computer chose
one of the twelve risk preference methods and one of the eight rows within
that particular method on a random basis to be payoff-relevant. Addition-
ally, one of the four benchmark games was chosen to be payoff-relevant as
well. Blanco et al. (2010) provided evidence that hedging behavior and
the corresponding biased beliefs and actions can only be problematic if the
hedging opportunities are highly transparent. Taking this consideration
into account, we provided feedback on the outcome of the risk elicitation
tasks only at the end of the experiment. Moreover, the risk elicitation
tasks were very heterogeneous in terms of potential earnings and their re-
spective payoffs. In addition, the subjects did not know which elicitation
task and which row within that specific task would be payoff-relevant to
them. Thus, it was not possible for subjects to create a portfolio and use
hedging behavior over different parts of the experiment.
On top of the risk elicitation tasks, we used three different benchmark
games resembling real-life situations as well as situations relevant to econo-
mists. As behavior in these settings should only depend on risk attitudes,
they will serve as benchmarks to contribute to the debate which risk elic-
itation methods are appropriate to predict behavior in these games. The
benchmark games appeared in a randomized order. First, we used the
12
2 DESIGN
same investment task as Charness and Gneezy (2010). Here, subjects
could decide how much they wanted to invest in stocks and bonds out
of an endowment of 10e. Subjects know that any investment in bonds is
a safe investment, and therefore they received the same amount they had
invested in bonds as income. Additionally, the amount they invested in
stocks was to be be multiplied by 2.5 or lost completely with equal chance.
Under EUT, this setting implies that both risk neutral and risk seeking
decision makers should invest the entire amount. Thus, in order to be able
to differentiate between them, we introduced another investment setting
where the potential payment for stocks was 1.5 times the invested amount.
The other benchmark game was a first-price sealed-bid auction against
a computerized opponent in line with Walker, Smith and Cox (1987). Sub-
jects could bid between 0.00e and 20.00e of their endowment, and the sub-
jects knew that the computer bid any amount between 0.00e and 20.00e
with equal chance. The potential earnings (E1 for subject 1) according to
the bids (x1; x2) are:
E1 =

20− x1 if x1 > x2
0 if x1 < x2
20− xi or E1 = 0 (with 50% chance) if x1 = x2
Our benchmark games are deliberately chosen in such a way that risk is
clearly relevant in the games, while being one step away from the artificial
risk elicitation mechanisms. Therefore, all benchmark games are framed
heavily, while still ensuring that risk attitudes should be the only factor
driving a subject’s decisions. The investment settings are very similar to
the risk elicitation mechanisms described above in the sense that they re-
semble a CE method (with the difference that you choose your sure payoff
and your lottery at the same time). The auction is more complex, as the
optimal risk-neutral solution is harder to compute, but here you basically
choose your own lottery, too. We therefore expect stronger correlation for
the investment games. Our aim is to let the data speak and to see which
method explains behavior best in each case.
The experiment concluded with an extensive questionnaire. Subjects re-
ceived an additional 3.00e for filling it out. Harrison et al. (2009) provide
evidence that the existence of a show-up fee could lead to an elevated level
of risk aversion in the subject pool. In our experiment, this moderate
show-up fee was only pointed out to the subjects after making their de-
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cisions in the risk elicitation methods and the benchmark games. Thus,
the show-up fee could not distort their preferences or their answers. In
order to incorporate survey-based measures, we asked subjects to provide
an answer on a ten-point Likert-scale to the following two questions in line
with Dohmen et al. (2011): ”In GENERAL, are you a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” and ”In FI-
NANCIAL SITUATIONS, are you a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?”. The perceived complexity of
these questions was elicited as well. In the questionnaire, we elicited the
following socioeconomic factors: Age, gender, field of study, years of uni-
versity education, nationality, high school grades in mathematics, monthly
income and monthly expenditure. Furthermore, we elicit cognitive abil-
ity by conducting a cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005). Lastly, we
assessed subjects’ personalities in line with Rammstedt and John (2007)
who provide a short measure of personality traits according to the BIG55
methodology introduced by Costa and McCrae (1992).
3 Results
We will first establish in sections 3.1 and 3.2 that the elicited risk parame-
ter is highly dependent on the particular variant of MPL used because the
overall distributions of switching points are very diverse and the rank cor-
relations between the different methods are low in most circumstances. In
section 3.3 we apply multiple measures of a quality of a method. First we
use the benchmark games to let the data speak which risk elicitation meth-
ods predict behavior in these games best. In Section 3.3.2, we will show
which method produces the most stable results overall. Section 3.4 con-
cludes with the result that the HLhigh method is the most stable method
and the has the highest predictive power.
3.1 Overall Distributions are Different
According to expected utility theory, a subject’s behavior does not depend
on which parameters are changed from row to row, as his underlying risk
parameter value is constant. As the different versions of the MPL are cal-
culated in such a way that the same switching point implies the same risk
5 In the BIG5, personality is measured along five dimensions: Agreeableness, Conscientousness, Ex-
traversion, Neuroticism and Openness.
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parameter interval, a consistent individual should have the same switch-
ing point in all versions of the MPL. This implies that the distributions
of switching points should be the same across methods, barring some noise.
First, see Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the distributions. It is
clearly visible at first glance that the distributions are not the same across
all methods. For example, in the CEp method, most subjects would be
classified as highly risk loving, whereas in the HLhigh method the majority
of subjects would be classified as risk averse.
To verify whether distributions across methods are the same, we conduct
two tests: a Friedman test, which shows that the means are not the same
across methods (p < 0.0001), and a Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows that
the distribution of answers is not the same across methods (p < 0.0001).
We conclude that the switching points are, contrary to standard theory
but in accordance with the literature, dependent upon the version of the
particular MPL variation used.
To see which specific versions are significantly different from each other,
we conduct a series of Wilcoxon tests, the natural pairwise analogue to the
Kruskal-Wallis test. We use the Wilcoxon test to give a comparison of the
distributions, as a difference in distributions is a more meaningful statistic
here than a comparison of means. The p-values of the pairwise tests can be
found in Table 4. Out of 55 pairwise comparisons, 28 comparisons indicate
that methods are different at p < 0.001. 34 (43) instances suggest that
methods are different at p < 0.01 (0.05) significance levels.6
We conclude that different methods deliver significantly different results,
and that the different versions of the MPL cannot be used interchangeably,
as the estimated risk preference parameter depends heavily on the version
used. A subject might easily be classified as risk loving in one version and
as risk averse in another. Of course we do not know a subject’s true risk
preferences, and therefore any of the methods might be able to classify a
subject correctly. To provide an answer to this puzzle, see Section 3.3.2,
where we conduct a quality assessment of the different methods.
6 Note that one should be careful while reading this table and the ones following because of the
presence of a multiple testing problem; therefore, we introduce a new notation in the tables: p-
values lower than 0.001 are denoted by three stars, p-values lower than 0.01 are denoted by two stars
and p-values lower than 0.05 are denoted by one star. p < 0.001 can be interpreted as significant,
even when using the conservative Bonferroni correction (see Abdi, 2007).
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Figure 1 Distributions of risk preferences; a low value indicates risk loving and a high
value indicates risk averse behavior; x-axis: switching points (e.g. risk preferences) of
subjects, where 1 means a subject switches from left to right in the first row and 9 means
a subject never switches; y-axis: frequency of switching point
Table 4: Pairwise Wilcoxon test for equality of distribution
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall GQ
CEhigh .00***
CElow .00*** .00***
CEsure .00*** .37 .00***
CEall .79 .00*** .00*** .00**
HLp .00*** .00** .28 .00*** .00***
HLhigh .00*** .00*** .02* .00*** .00*** .00***
HLlow .00*** .02* .23 .01** .00*** .68 .00***
HLall .00*** .31 .02* .04* .00*** .08 .00*** .39
GQ .02* .03* .00*** .29 .04* .00*** .00*** .00*** .00**
FQ .00*** .64 .00** .29 .00*** .02* .00*** .04* .36 .00***
Notes: p-values of pairwise Wilcoxon tests are displayed; GQ: general question;
FQ:financial question; stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
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Table 5: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall GQ
CEhigh .46***
CElow .33*** .44***
CEsure .05 .22* .26*
CEall .03 .18 -.03 .19
HLp .17 .15 .17 .21* -.04
HLhigh .20 .39*** .21* .03** .21* .25*
HLlow .31** .28** .25* .19 -.02 .13 .21*
HLall .24 .21* -.01 .08 .19 .04 -.01 .08
GQ .15 .13* .06 -.12 .11 .02 .14 .04 .06
FQ .26* .23* .29* .18 .10 -.04 .04 .24* .13 .46***
Notes: Table includes the nine different methods and the questionnaires (GQ: general
questionnaire, FQ: financial questionnaire); stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **:
p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
3.2 Rank Correlations are Low
In this section we look at the rank correlation coefficients between the
different methods and the questionnaire answers. If there are high rank
correlations between the risk elicitation methods, one might argue that it is
irrelevant which one is used if one intends to control for risk attitudes under
any given circumstance. Rank correlations between the MPL methods and
the questionnaire measures can be found in Table 5. We see that some of
the correlations are significant, but only 11% of all pairwise comparisons in
total if we test conservatively at p < 0.001 because of the multiple testing
problem. Pay special attention to the fact that HLp, the most widely used
method today, has no significant rank correlations with any of the other
methods.7 See also Table 20 in the Appendix for standard correlations,
which basically give the same results as Table 5.
These findings provide further evidence that the elicitation procedure should
be chosen with care as the elicited risk aversion coefficient and also the rel-
ative ranking of subjects according to each method varies within broad
boundaries.
7 Also, the Financial questionnaire (FQ) results have much higher correlations with the other methods
than the general questionnaire (GQ) results, strengthening the argument that risk attitudes are
domain specific.
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3.3 Method Quality Indicators
We use two avenues to measure a method’s quality: its predictive power
(section 3.3.1) and its stability (section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Predictive Power
In order to see which method predicts behavior best in our benchmark
games, we look at three statistics: predictive power by simple OLS regres-
sion, predictive power by Spearman rank correlation, and absolute average
deviation from the prediction.
In Table 6, we see in the upper part the outcome of an OLS regression
where we control for personality measures (BIG5 test, see Section 2) and
socioeconomic variables (self-reported income, gender, age, the number of
correct answers on a cognitive reflection test (CRT) and years of university
education). In the lower part of Table 6 you see Spearman rank correlation
coefficients, which we include because one of the most important factors in
a measure of a subject’s risk attitudes is the correct rank ordering of sub-
jects. The OLS regression can be understood as follows: The dependent
variable is the outcome of a particular benchmark game, and the indepen-
dent variables include the outcome of one of the risk elicitation methods
plus all controls metioned above.8 The corresponding adjusted R2 values
can be found in parentheses below the coefficients. The OLS regression
equation is then given by
BGi,j = β0 + β1 ∗MPLj +
6∑
k=2
βk ∗BIG5k +
11∑
l=7
βl ∗ SEl + β12 ∗ CRT + i,
where i denotes the index of benchmark games (BG), j denotes the index
of risk measures, MPL denotes the outcome of a risk elicitation method,
BIG5 denotes personality measures according to the BIG5, SE denotes
the socioeconomic variables and CRT denotes the number of correct an-
swers in the cognitive reflection test.
Additionally, we can calculate for each risk elicitation method (but not
for the questionnaires) a point prediction in each of the benchmark games.
In Table 7 we report the absolute average deviations from these predictions,
8 It is not possible to add controls in the Spearman rank correlation.
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averaged over all three benchmark games according to the formula
AAD = (
n∑
i=1
|Hi −H∗i |+
n∑
i=1
|Li − L∗i |+
n∑
i=1
|Ai − A∗i |
2
)/(3n),
where Hi denotes high investment game outcomes and H
∗
i high investment
game predictions (L stands for investment low and A for auction).9
In the auction, none of the methods produce statistically significant re-
sults in the OLS regression. This is puzzling, as the auction can in itself
be seen as a risk elicitation procedure, albeit with heavy framing. Recent
literature, however, provides evidence that not only risk attitudes but also
other factors like regret aversion (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008)
could drive behavior in auctions. As far as the Spearman rank correla-
tion is concerned, the CEp method is the only one that is rank correlated
(p < 0.05) with auction behavior.
In the investment games, the methods produce much better results. In
the low investment setting, HLhigh has the biggest explanatory power,
with CEhigh also having significant explanatory power. Note that it is
surprising that HLhigh is the best predictor both in the regression and the
rank correlation, as the investment games in themselves can be interpreted
as certainty-equivalent methods, so one would expect one of these methods
to perform best.
In the high investment setting, many methods (HLhigh, HLlow, CEhigh,
CElow, CEp, and the questionnaires) are able to explain a part of the vari-
ance, with CEp being the one giving the best results (p < 0.01). Note that
in this setting, survey-based measures perform very well, so questionnaire
measures seem to serve as good proxies for subjects’ risk preferences in
some circumstances.10
As far as the deviations from the predictions are concerned, HLhigh per-
forms best with an average deviation of 1.75 across all benchmark games
9 Note that we divide the deviation in the auction game by 2 because the choice range in the auction
game is twice as high.
10 Note that in all regressions, none of the controls were significant at p < 0.05. This implies that
behavior seems to primarily be driven by risk attitudes.
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with CEp and CElow also having low deviations.11
In conclusion, HLhigh and CEp yield the best results in explaining be-
havior, with HLhigh having the lowest deviation from the prediction of
behavior in the benchmark games. We conclude that HLhigh has the high-
est predictive power with CEp being a close runner-up.12
Table 6: Explanatory Power
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall GQ FQ
OLS coefficients
Auction .21 .14 .15 .01 .14 .01 0 .18 -.16 0.13 -0.08
(.05) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Inv. Low .04 .27*** .13 0 .21 .11 .43*** .07 .13 0.3* 0.09
(.00) (.03) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.08) (.00) (.00) (.02) (.00)
Inv. High .27*** .21* .08 -.07 -.17 .13 .19 .19* -.06 0.28** 0.25**
(.16) (.12) (.09) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.11) (.12) (.08) (.13) (.13)
Spearman rank correlation coefficients
Auct. .23* .09 .14 .17 .07 .11 .06 .16 -.13 .10 .11
Inv. L .02 .19 .17 .06 .06 .11 .36*** .12 .04 .19 .11
Inv. H .28** .28** .05 .00 .03 .13 .26* .23* .09 .31** .28**
Notes: In the OLS regression, the dependent variable is the outcome in one of the four
benchmark games, the independent variables are the outcome from one method plus
controls (age, gender, BIG5, CRT test, income, years of university education); the
adjusted R2 value for the regression can be found below a coefficient; Stars are given as
follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
Table 7: Deviations from Predictions
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall
Deviation 1.91 2.41 2.19 2.03 2.11 2.27 1.75 2.17 2.11
Notes: Absolute average deviations from the predictions in the benchmark games
11 Note that one might be concerned with this analysis because if a method generally classifies subjects
as risk-averse, it is not surprising that it explains behavior well in the low investment setting, as
subjects naturally behave risk-averse in this setting due to the parameters. However, this critique
is not valid for any method that provides good predictions across multiple benchmark games (e.g.
HLhigh).
12 For a robustness check of our results, refer to Table 19 in the Appendix, which confirms our results
if people’s risk attitudes follow constant absolute risk aversion instead of CRRA.
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3.3.2 Stability Measures
In this section, we evaluate the stability of the different MPL representa-
tions. Remember that after our subjects had gone through all nine MPL
methods, three of them were randomly chosen and presented to them again.
A method can be described as stable if the given answers between the first
and the second time a method was encountered are very similar. To an-
alyze this similarity, we use three criteria: equality of overall distribution,
equality of rank ordering and absolute average deviation between the first
and second answers. For reasons of completeness, we also report the per-
ceived complexity of each method.13
Table 8 reports these measures. In the first column we give p-values from
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that tests whether the distributions of the first
and second time a method is encountered are the same. A significant
p-value means that the distributions are significantly different from each
other, indicating a low stability of overall distribution across a 30 minute
time period.
The second column gives the rank correlation between the first and second
time a method was encountered. This measure is important because if a
method’s overall distribution merely shifted up or down without changing
the rank ordering of subjects, this method can also be described as stable.
The third column reports the absolute average deviation (AAD) of sub-
ject’s answers when a particular method is presented to them again, com-
pared to the first time. A lower value is therefore better. The last column
gives the means of the perceived complexity of a method on a 1 to 10 Likert
scale.
To visualize these results, we also report the distributions of the differences
in switching points between the first and second time a method is encoun-
tered in Figure 2.
Any method that does not yield stable results over a 30 minute time period
cannot be described as stable, and stability is a highly preferable charac-
teristic in a risk measure. For the KS-test (column 1 in Table 8), stability
means a nonsignificant result, indicating that the overall distributions of
answers are not too different between the first and second time a method
13 We do not use Complexity as a stability measure, as the impact of a higher perceived complexity
is not clear. On the one hand, one might argue that a higher measure in these categories implies
noisier behavior, on the other hand one might argue that a subject takes more time thinking about
the problem at hand.
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Table 8: Stability Measures
Method KS-Test Rank Corr. AAD Complexity
CEp .453 .51*** 1.60 3.42
CEsure .003 .51** 1.37 3.92
CEhigh .644 .39* 1.48 3.97
CElow .007 .35 1.96 3.20
CEall .005 .16 1.8 4.81
HLp .240 .23 1.33 4.21
HLhigh .879 .45** 1.24 3.78
HLlow .006 .25 2.04 4.29
HLall .000 .19 1.85 5.75
Notes: First column: p-values for a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test of equality of distribution;
Second column: rank correlation between the distributions of first and second answers
(stars indicate significant rank correlation); AAD means Absolute Average Deviation
between the first and second decision in the same method; Complexity indicates a
subject’s perceived complexity of a method; stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **:
p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
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Figure 2 Distributions of absolute differences in switching points between the first and
second time a method is encountered
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was encountered. Four of the methods have a nonsignificant p-value: CEp,
CEhigh, HLp, HLhigh.
A significant rank correlation (column 2 in Table 8) also indicates a stable
risk measure, indicating a shift in the distribution, but no change in rank
ordering. We see that three of those four methods have significant rank
correlations with p < 0.01: CEp, CEsure and HLhigh.
A low absolute average deviation in answers is also an indicator of a stable
risk measure, and the method with the lowest deviation is HLhigh, followed
by HLp and CEsure.
Concerning the complexity, we see that a method that is perceived as less
complex does not necessarily imply more stability in answers, as CElow
has the lowest complexity rating, yet it is classified as unstable in all three
categories. However, a general tendency of low complexity indicating more
stability can be observed.
We conclude that HLhigh is the most stable method, as it is the only
method that performs well in all three categories, with the overall distribu-
tions of switching points not significantly different, high rank correlations
and low average deviation. CEp, CEsure and HLp perform well in two of
the three categories.
3.4 Results Conclusion
In the benchmark games, as far as predictive power is concerned, we con-
clude that HLhigh has the highest predictive power with CEp being a close
second.14
We also found a connection between stability and self-reported complex-
ity of methods. We conclude that only the HLhigh (Drichoutis and Lusk,
2012), HLp (Holt and Laury, 2002), CEsure (Cohen et al., 1987; Abdellaoui
et al., 2011) and CEp (Bruner, 2009) methods lead to consistent results
within a 30-minute time frame, with the HLhigh method being by far
the most consistent: The HLhigh method’s performance is superior to the
other methods in terms of deviations from normative predictions, overall
and relative stability across time, etc. Our findings are further supported
by the fact that we controlled for personality traits, various socioeconomic
factors and cognitive reflection in our analyses.
14 For non-incentivized surveys, our data shows that eliciting preferences with general and financial
questions is a relatively good predictor compared to several incentivized elicitation methods.
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Therefore, we conclude that while CEp also has high predictive power
and good stability in answers, the most stable MPL method with the high-
est predictive power is HLhigh, which corresponds to a method derived by
Drichoutis and Lusk (2012) in our alternative interpretation.
4 Conclusion
We conducted a holistic assessment and analysis of MPL risk elicitation
methods that are present in the economics literature with a sophisticated
experimental design using a unified framework and representation method.
Previous findings in the literature (Dave et al, 2010; Crosetto and Filippin,
2013; etc.) indicate that between-method consistency of particular meth-
ods is low. We confirm this finding by extending our analysis to all popu-
lar methods. Furthermore, we show that distributional differences among
methods are far from negligible. All this implies that an arbitrary selec-
tion of a particular risk assessment method can lead to differing results and
misleading revealed preferences. Thus, it matters which elicitation method
is used by researchers in order to control for risk and other preferences.
Our main takeaway is that we provide a suggestion which elicitation method
to use based on objective criteria that assess within-method as well as
between-method consistency and validity in real-world settings, and that
suggestion is to use the HLhigh method by Drichoutis and Lusk (2012).
In a broader context, we researchers should take care when choosing which
risk elicitation method they use. To be taken into consideration are the
nature of the task they intend to control for, trade-off effects between noise,
exactness and simplicity. Moreover, we find that changing both the poten-
tial rewards and probabilities is perceived as relatively complex by subjects
and yields inconsistent results. The debate between changing the proba-
bilities or rewards (Bruner, 2009) seems to be far from settled as one of
the methods in each context (HLhigh and CEp) delivers promising results.
In addition, our findings might provide guidance in implementing other
elicitation methods in the MPL format - e.g. loss aversion (Ga¨chter et
al., 2010), willingness to pay (Kahneman et al., 1990), individual discount
rates (Harrison et al., 2002) - in terms of whether to vary probabilities,
rewards or using a certainty equivalent.
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5 Appendix
Risk Preference Elicitation Methods
Note that all the preference elicitation methods described here are rep-
resented top-down for simplicity reasons. An example of a bottom-up
representation of a particular method is provided in later in the Appendix.
Table 9: CEp method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
1 8 - - 0.62 4 0.38 12
1 8 - - 0.564 4 0.4364 12
1 8 - - 0.52 4 0.48 12
1 8 - - 0.481 4 0.5192 12
1 8 - - 0.447 4 0.553 12
1 8 - - 0.411 4 0.589 12
1 8 - - 0.374 4 0.626 12
1 8 - - 0.323 4 0.677 12
Table 10: CEhigh method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 10.63
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 11.16
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 11.7
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12.32
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 13.04
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 14.07
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 15.75
1 8 - - 0.5 4 0.5 20.31
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Table 11: CElow method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
1 9.5 - - 0.5 6.1 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 6.61 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 6.89 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 7.09 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 7.24 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 7.38 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 7.51 0.5 12
1 9.5 - - 0.5 7.66 0.5 12
Table 12: CEsure method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
1 8.91 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 8.5 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 8.16 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 7.85 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 7.57 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 7.27 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 6.96 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
1 6.56 - - 0.5 4 0.5 12
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Table 13: CEall method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.5 8 0.5 8 0.5 10 0.5 5.34
0.5 10 0.5 5.34 0.5 11 0.5 3.83
0.5 11 0.5 3.83 0.5 12 0.5 2.61
0.5 12 0.5 2.61 0.5 13 0.5 1.83
0.5 13 0.5 1.83 0.5 14 0.5 1.41
0.5 14 0.5 1.41 0.5 15 0.5 1.21
0.5 15 0.5 1.21 0.5 16.5 0.5 1.09
0.5 16.5 0.5 1.09 0.5 20.5 0.5 1.01
Table 14: HLp method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.2 9 0.8 7.2 0.2 17.2 0.8 0.45
0.3 9 0.7 7.2 0.3 17.2 0.7 0.45
0.4 9 0.6 7.2 0.4 17.2 0.6 0.45
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 17.2 0.5 0.45
0.6 9 0.4 7.2 0.6 17.2 0.4 0.45
0.7 9 0.3 7.2 0.7 17.2 0.3 0.45
0.8 9 0.2 7.2 0.8 17.2 0.2 0.45
0.9 9 0.1 7.2 0.9 17.2 0.1 0.45
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Table 15: HLhigh method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 10.96 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 11.55 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 12.15 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 12.87 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 13.75 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 15.01 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 17.21 0.5 3.7
0.5 9 0.5 7.2 0.5 23.83 0.5 3.7
Table 16: HLlow method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.5 16.09 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 15.3 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 14.41 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 13.35 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 12.18 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 10.85 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 9.29 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
0.5 7.35 0.5 7 0.5 3.7 0.5 17.2
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Table 17: HLall method
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.99 7.55 0.01 0 0.81 8.08 0.19 0
0.94 7.93 0.06 0 0.78 8.73 0.22 0
0.89 8.28 0.11 0 0.75 9.28 0.25 0
0.84 8.60 0.16 0 0.72 9.83 0.28 0
0.79 8.98 0.21 0 0.69 10.53 0.31 0
0.74 9.33 0.26 0 0.66 11.33 0.34 0
0.69 9.70 0.31 0 0.63 12.90 0.37 0
0.64 10.05 0.36 0 0.62 28.95 0.38 0
Example of Bottom-Up Representation
Table 18: HLhigh method; Bottom-Up Appearance
Left Option Right Option
pL1 pi
L
1 p
L
2 pi
L
2 p
R
1 pi
R
1 p
R
2 pi
R
2
0.5 23.83 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 17.21 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 15.01 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 13.75 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 12.87 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 12.15 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 11.55 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
0.5 10.96 0.5 3.7 0.5 9 0.5 7.2
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Sample Screenshots
Figure 3 Decision Making Screen for lotteries; subjects indicate which row they wanted
to switch from the left to the right option by clicking one of the radio buttons in the middle
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Figure 4 Revision Screen for Lotteries; subjects indicated whether they want to revise
their first decision
Robustness Check (CARA)
In this section we report the regressions from Section 3.3.1 with the dif-
ferent assumption that a subject’s utility function follows not CRRA but
CARA, that is, it follows: u(c) = −e−aca . We chose CARA for our ro-
bustness check as it is the most commonly assumed utility function after
CRRA. In nearly all instances, the results do not change at all, signifi-
cancewise. We conclude that the results are indifferent to the assumption
of the underlying utility function. Our hypothesis that CRRA is a valid as-
sumption is further supported by the fact that the adjusted R2 coefficients
of the regressions assuming CRRA are higher
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Table 19: Explanatory Power of the methods with CARA (OLS)
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall
OLS coefficients (with controls)
Auction -5.23 6.83 5.47 1.29 3.67 -1.24 -0.01 5.03 4.81
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.04)
Inventment Low 0.99 6.83* 4.57 1.65 9.08 2.37 10.62*** 1.85 3.05
(.00) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.08) (.00) (.00)
Investment High 6.90*** 3.66 2.63 1.57 7.66 2.88 4.72 5.63* 0.18
(.16) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.11) (.09) (.11) (.12) (.08)
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regression results with CARA instead of CRRA; the dependent variable is the
outcome in one of the benchmark games, the independent variables are the outcome from
one method and controls; the adjusted R2 value for the regression can be found below the
coefficients; Stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
Robustness Check (Standard Correlations)
Table 20: Correlation Coefficients
CEp CEhigh CElow CEsure CEall HLp HLhigh HLlow HLall GQ
CEhigh .46***
CElow .37*** .46***
CEsure .01 .18 .25*
CEall .02 .12 0 .16
HLp .13 .12 .15 .23** -.08
HLhigh .07 .27** .10 .26* .12 .26*
HLlow .27** .21* .20 .17 -.04 .12 .10
HLall .17 .16 -.06 .04 .17 -.01 -.08 .03
GQ .12 .16 0 -.14 .09 -.07 .12 .02 .01
FQ .25** .17 .27** .19 .07 -.05 -.02 .20 .03 .46**
Notes: Included are the nine methods and the questionnaires (GQ: general question;
FQ:financial question); stars are given as follows: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
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Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in decision making.
You will be asked to make a series of choices that will affect your payment
at the end of the experiment. Please pay close attention to the instruc-
tions, and if you have any questions raise your hand and an employee of
the lab will help you with any questions you might have.
Also, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire, where your answers
are not relevant for your payoff. All your decisions and answers during the
experiment will stay completely anonymous to everyone.
In ’Part 1’, you will make decisions in twelve different situations, where
in each situation you will make one choice.
A sample decision screen is provided above and on the piece of paper
Figure 1 This is the first sample screen subjects saw; note that it does not match any of
the nine methods.
in front of you. Please feel free to take notes on this paper.
On each screen you see two columns (’LEFT’ and ’RIGHT’). In each col-
umn you have eight rows with different payment possibilities. You have to
decide which option you prefer in each row.
For example on the screen provided above, in the first row you will have
to choose between:
’LEFT’: receive 8e with 100% probability
’RIGHT’: receive 14e with 36.0% probability or 5e with 64.0% probability
1
In the second row, you would make a choice between:
’LEFT’: receive 8e with 100% probability
’RIGHT’: receive 14e with 41.6% probability or 5e with 58.4% probability
In the center of the screen you will find a number of radio buttons. You
can only click one of those buttons on each screen. This button indicates
at what row you want to switch from ’LEFT’ to ’RIGHT’.
If you choose row 3, that means you prefer ’LEFT’ for the first 2 rows,
Figure 2 Example Screen with colorcoding
but you prefer ’RIGHT’ for rows 3-8.
If you choose row 6, that means you prefer ’LEFT’ for the first 5 rows, but
you prefer ’RIGHT’ for rows 6-8.
If you choose row 1 - ALWAYS RIGHT, that means you prefer ’RIGHT’
in every row.
If you choose row ALWAYS LEFT, that means you prefer ’LEFT’ in every
row.
When you are finished making your decision for a screen, click ’OK’ and
you will get to the next screen where you will see your choice again. In case
you are not satisfied with your choice, you can change your choice once if
you wish to. Your second choice is final and cannot be changed afterwards.
After each decision screen, we will ask you how difficult it was for you
to make a decision on the previous screen. These questions do not affect
your payment. Still, we ask you to answer truthfully.
For your payoff of Part 1, one screen of the twelve is randomly selected
by the computer. The computer will also select one of the rows at random.
2
In this row, you have chosen ’LEFT’ or ’RIGHT’. Finally the computer will
randomize between the two possible outcomes based on the given proba-
bilities.
For example, the computer chooses at random the following row to be
relevant for your payoff:
’LEFT’: ’receive 20e with 70% probability or 5e with 30% probability.’
’RIGHT’: ’receive 15e with 60% probability or 10e with 40% probability.’
You have chosen left in that particular row. Therefore, you either get 20e
or 5e, but the probability to get 20e is higher.
Every screen and every row on each screen has an equal chance to be
chosen by the computer to be relevant for your payoff. Considering that
every decision you make matters, we advise you to think carefully about
each decision you make.
After you made these twelve decisions, ’Part 2’ will start. Instructions
for ’Part 2’ will be given on the screens themselves. One situation in ’Part
2’ will be randomly selected to affect your payment. ’Part 1’ and ’Part 2’
are completely independent of each other.
Your final payoff will then be the sum of your payoffs from ’Part 1’ and
’Part 2’.
If you have no questions, please click ’OK’ to answer a couple of con-
trol questions. These questions will make sure that you have understood
the setup. You cannot commence with the experiment unless you answer
the control questions correctly.
The experiment will start afterwards!
If you have questions, please raise your hand at any time and an experi-
menter will provide assistance.
Auction Instructions
You will now participate in an auction against a computer opponent over
a good that has a value of 20e. You can bid any amount from 0e to 20e,
and you can specify your bid down to the exact Cent.
3
The computer will bid a random number from 0e to 20e, down to the
exact Cent, and each number has an equal probability to be chosen.
If your bid is higher than the computer’s, you will get 20e minus your
bid as your payoff. If your bid is lower than the computer’s, you will get
0e.
If your bids are tied, the winner of the auction is selected randomly and
you will receive the payoff of 20e minus your bid with 50% probability.
Example 1: If you bid 12.41e and the computer bids 16.53e, your payoff
is 0e as the computer’s bid is higher than yours.
Example 2: If you bid 18.8e and the computer bids 0.17e, your payoff
is 1.2e (=20-18.8) from this auction, as your bid is higher than the com-
puter’s.
Remember, you can bid any amount from 0e to 20e. If you win the
auction, your payoff is 20e minus your bid.
Now, please type in how much you want to bid for the good.
Investment Game Instructions
You will now have the opportunity to invest an endowment of 10.00e.
There are two assets you can invest in: STOCKS and BONDS.
The amount you invest in bonds does not give returns. You will get the
amount you invested as your payoff for sure.
STOCKS: STOCKS can have higher gains than BONDS, but are more
risky. The amount you invest in STOCKS has a 50% chance to be multi-
plied by 1.5, and a 50% chance to be lost.
You can freely allocate your endowment of 10.00e between the two as-
sets, down to the exact Cent.
Example 1: You invest 10e in BONDS and 0e in STOCKS. Your pay-
off will be 10e.
Example 2: You choose to invest 2.58e in BONDS and 7.42e in STOCKS.
4
Your payoff will either be 13.71e (=7.42*1.5+2.58) with 50% probability,
or 2.58e with 50% probability.
Example 3: You choose to invest all 10e into STOCKS. Your payoff will
either be 15e (=10*1.5) with 50% probability, or 0e with 50% probability.
Remember:
You will receive the amount you invest in BONDS as your payoff.
You will receive the amount you invest in STOCKS times 1.5 with 50%
probability, and 0e with 50% probability.
Please choose how much you want to invest in STOCKS (the rest of your
endowment will be invested in BONDS):
5
